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Introduction and summary
The U.S. economy is beginning to emerge from a  
severe economic downturn precipitated by a financial 
crisis without parallel since the Great Depression. As 
thoughts turn to the appropriate path of future policy 
during the recovery, a number of economists have prof-
fered the recession that began in 1937 as a cautionary 
tale. That sharp but short-lived recession took place 
while the U.S. economy was recovering from the Great 
Depression of 1929–33.1 
According to one interpretation, the 1937 recession 
was caused by premature tightening of monetary pol-
icy and fiscal policy prompted by inflation concerns. 
The lesson to be drawn is that policymakers should 
err on the side of caution. An alternative explanation 
is that the recession was caused by increases in labor 
costs due to the industrial policies that formed part of 
the New Deal—the policies of social and economic 
reform introduced in the 1930s by President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt. If a policy lesson can be drawn from 
this, it might have more to do with the dangers of in-
terfering with market mechanisms. 
The goal of this article is to present the relevant 
facts about the recession of 1937 and assess the com-
peting explanations. Although overshadowed by its 
more dramatic predecessor, the recession of 1937 has 
received some attention before, in particular Roose 
(1954) and Friedman and Schwartz (1963). Then, as 
now, the competing explanations centered on fiscal 
policy, that is, the impact of taxation and government 
spending on the economy; monetary policy, or the 
management of currency and reserves; and labor rela-
tions policy, or more broadly government policy to-
ward businesses. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows.  
I first present the salient facts about the 1937 reces-
sion. I then review the competing explanations and fi-
nally provide a quantitative assessment of their likely 
contributions to the recession. I find that monetary 
policy and fiscal policy do not explain the timing of 
the downturn but do account well for its severity and 
most of the recovery. Wages explain little of the down-
turn and none of the recovery. 
The recession 
Before describing the salient features of the 1937 
recession, I first take up the issue of its timing. The tra-
ditional National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
business cycle dates put the peak of the recession in 
May 1937 and the trough in June 1938. Romer (1994) 
argues that there are inconsistencies in the way these 
dates were established over time, devises an algorithm 
that closely reproduces the dates of post-war business 
cycles, and applies it to the Miron and Romer (1990) 
industrial production series to produce new dates. In 
the case of the 1937 recession, Romer identifies August 
1937 as the start of the recession. Cole and Ohanian 
(1999) implicitly use the same starting date when they 
state that industrial production peaked in that month. 
I will stick to the traditional date for several reasons. 
One is that Romer (1994) directs her argument mostly 
at cycles before 1927, when a shift in NBER method-
ology occurred. Another is that the NBER dating process 
considers a broader set of series than just industrial 
production. Roose (1954) lists the peaks of 40 monthly 
series and shows that 27 series peaked before August. 
Finally, industrial production as measured by the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System peaked 
in May 1937. There is no controversy over the end 
date of the recession, set by the NBER and Romer 
(1994) in June 1938. 17 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Figure 1 plots real annual gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita (population aged 16 years and older) 
over the twentieth century. The trend line follows that 
series’ average growth rate over the periods 1919–29 
and 1947–97, and is set to coincide with the series in 
1929. This is the metric by which Cole and Ohanian 
(2004) show that the recovery after the Great Depression 
was weak, since the series does not return to trend until 
1942. The exceptional nature of the Great Depression 
and the ensuing recovery is starkly evident, but the 1937 
recession barely registers in the annual series. The 
reason is that the recession is so short, beginning in 
mid-1937 and ending in mid-1938. 
To get a better sense of the importance of this  
episode, we need to look at higher-frequency data. The 
national income and product accounts (NIPAs) are not 
available at the usual quarterly frequency before 1946, 
however, so we have to resort to other series. Figure 2 
plots a monthly index of industrial production, which 
will be the main focus of my analysis in the final section. 
Again, a trend line has been added, growing at the aver-
age rate of growth for the period from January 1919 
to August 1929. The severity of the 1937 recession is 
now apparent. In particular, it is striking to see that the 
speed at which industrial production contracted is greater 
than during the Great Depression. From its peak in 
July 1937 to its trough in May 1938, industrial produc-
tion declined 32 percent. By comparison, it took two 
full years for industrial production to fall as much from 
its July 1929 peak. Other measures confirm the sever-
ity of the 1937 recession—for example, employment 
fell by 22 percent and stock prices declined by over 
40 percent (Carter et al., tables Cb46 and Cb53). 
Another striking aspect of the 1937 recession is the 
recovery that ensued. The rate of growth of industrial 
production was slightly higher than that which prevailed 
over the period 1933–37 (22 percent per year compared 
with 21 percent), and the recovery proceeded smoothly, 
without the pauses and reversals that marked 1934. Had 
it not been for the 1937 recession, industrial production 
would have returned to its trend three or four years earlier. 
Although official NIPA data are not available on 
a quarterly basis during that period, Balke and Gordon 
(1986) have estimated the components of gross na-
tional product (GNP), using regression-based interpo-
lation. Although these estimates should be taken with 
care, I show them in figure 3; I present the growth rates 
in table 1 for the period of interest, with the averages 
for the preceding expansion as the point of comparison. 
They display some interesting differences of timing 
with industrial production. Nondurables consumption 
growth, strong in the last three quarters of 1936, stalled 
in early 1937 and collapsed in the third quarter. The 
various components of investment do not show such a 
clear pattern until the fourth quarter of 1937, when all 
growth rates turn negative. In contrast, the recovery is 
firm across all sectors in the third quarter of 1938. 
FIguRE 1
Gross domestic product per capita, 1900–2000  
Notes: The population is age 16 and older; gross domestic 
product per capita is measured on an annual basis over the 
period 1900–2000. The trend line (black) grows at the average 
growth rate over the periods 1919–29 and 1947–97.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Carter et al. 
(2006), tables Aa125–144 and Ca9–19.
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FIguRE 2
Industrial production per capita, 1919–42
Notes: The population is age 16 and older; industrial production 
per capita is measured on a monthly basis over the period 
January 1919–December 1942. The trend line (black) is the 
average growth rate over the period January 1919–August 
1929. The shaded areas indicate official periods of recession 
as identified by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, G.17 statistical 
release, various issues.
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Growth rates of components of gross national product, annualized, 1933–38
TaBlE 1
  Nondurable    Producers’ 
  goods and  Durable  durable  Nonresidential  Residential   Government
  services  goods  equipment  structures  structures  purchases
  ( - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - percent - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - )
1933:Q1–1935:Q4  3.8  17.2  32.5  8.9  27.5  5.0
1936:Q1  2.5  18.4  4.5  7.1  –  26.9  39.8
1936:Q2  10.9  18.1  29.6  –    21.8  0.7  11.2
1936:Q3  10.5  21.5  44.6  59.4  93.0  3.8
1936:Q4  14.1  11.6  29.5  47.7  –  15.7  –  2.0
1937:Q1  –  0.4  7.9  26.5  21.9  15.7  –  19.9
1937:Q2  –  0.3  –7.4  0.5  112.0   36.2  –  2.4
1937:Q3  –  7.8  10.8  3.9  –  96.0  –  63.5  2.8
1937:Q4  –  2.5  –  47.4  –  106.0  –  54.5  –  63.6  7.1
1938:Q1  –  2.7  –  65.6  –  73.0  –  3.4  0.0  19.3
1938:Q2  –  4.9  –  17.4  –  45.2  –  71.3  13.6  6.9
1938:Q3  15.9  25.7  56.8  41.9  114.1  4.0
1938:Q4  7.7  44.0  43.5  21.2  45.4  3.8
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Balke and Gordon (1986).
Fiscal policy 
In the 1930s, total government was still a relatively 
small but growing share of the economy: In 1929 total 
government consumption and investment represented 
9 percent of GDP, and by 1939 it had reached 16 per-
cent. During the same period, the federal government 
grew in importance relative to the states and local govern-
ment: Federal spending grew from 1.6 percent to 6.4 
percent of GDP.2 However, figure 4 shows that the 
stance of fiscal policy at the state and local level did 
not change much during the period under consider-
ation. I will therefore concentrate on federal finances. 
Until the Great Depression, the traditional fiscal 
policy had been one of balanced budgets. During the 
early stages of the New Deal, the vast expansion of 
the federal government was financed through debt, but 
by the middle of the 1930s, concerns were growing 
over the size of the public debt, which had gone from 
16 percent of GDP in 1929 to 40 percent in 1936. 
In 1936, there was a deliberate attempt to return 
to a balanced budget. Figure 5 shows the components 
of federal revenues by source and also plots expendi-
tures. On the expenditures side, there is little to note 
except a very large spike in the second quarter of 1936. 
This represents the payment of bonuses to World War I 
veterans, which Congress decided to accelerate that 
year before the November elections. This probably 
boosted demand in the last three quarters of 1936 well 
above its earlier levels (table 1), but it is hard to see 
how it could have precipitated a recession on its own. 
FIguRE 3
Components of gross national product, 1919–41
Note: Data are quarterly over the period 1919:Q1–1941:Q4. 
Source: Balke and Gordon (1986).
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On the revenue side, it is apparent that revenues 
increased sharply in the first quarter of 1937. There are 
two main factors. The most important one is the increase 
in income tax revenue, which grew by 66 percent from 
1936 to 1937. This was due to a significant increase 
in income tax rates in the Revenue Act passed in June 
1936. The rates previously ranged from 4 percent 
(starting at $4,000) to 59 percent (above $1 million). 
They remained unchanged for income brackets below 
$50,000, but were increased above that threshold, to 
reach 75 percent on the top earners. As a result, the 
average marginal tax rate for incomes above $4,000 
almost doubled, from 6.4 percent to 11.6 percent.3
The second factor, of lesser quantitative importance, 
is the beginning of Social Security taxation. The Social 
Security tax rate was 2 percent, with half paid by the 
employer, and the ceiling was $3,000. Collection be-
gan in January 1937, and represented 10.5 percent of 
total federal tax receipts for the year 1937. 
The undistributed profits tax
One interesting component of fiscal policy in that 
period was the introduction of a tax on undistributed 
profits (Lent, 1948). The motivation for the tax was not 
so much to raise revenue as to encourage firms to pay 
out dividends. The government saw this as desirable 
for two reasons. First, the accumulation of earnings by 
corporations allowed some earnings to avoid income 
taxation. Second, it was thought that firms did not know 
the best uses of the capital they were retaining and could 
possibly spend it on wasteful projects. According to this 
view, it would be better to send the earnings to the share-
holder and flowing back into general capital markets. 
The tax was announced, without warning, by 
President Roosevelt in March 1936, and enacted in the 
summer as part of the Revenue Act of 1936. Earnings 
that were not distributed as dividends were subjected 
to an additional tax. Lent (1948) found that the tax gen-
erated little revenue because most corporations, espe-
cially the large ones, simply paid out larger dividends. 
Also, smaller corporations were able to use legal mecha-
nisms to require their shareholders to reinvest the div-
idends into shares of the corporation. The firms that were 
the most affected (as shown by the increase in their 
tax liability) were the medium-sized corporations. 
The tax, although it had little effect in terms of 
revenues, could have had two effects on the economy. 
First, to the extent that small and medium firms find it 
difficult to access credit and capital markets, they have 
to rely on internal sources of funds to finance invest-
ment. The tax would obviously increase the cost of 
FiguRe 5
Federal government revenues, by source,
and expenditures, 1934–41
Note: Data are quarterly over the period 1934:Q1–1941:Q4.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(1943), table 150, pp. 513–515.
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FiguRe 4
Federal and state and local receipts
and expenditures, 1929–41
Note: Data are annual.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income 
and Product Accounts of the United States, Historical Tables, 
tables 3.2 and 3.3.
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investment for those firms. Second, the tax was reflective 
of a changed political climate and increasingly popu-
list rhetoric coming from politicians and the Roosevelt 
administration. At the same time as the tax was an-
nounced, the Roosevelt administration was becoming 
increasingly vocal against “economic royalists,” alleged 
monopolists, and business in general. Although the 
tax was widely considered a failure and was repealed 
in all but name after two years, it may have played a 
psychological role in increasing uncertainty about the 
profitability of investment. This assessment must be 
tempered by the fact that, as table 1 (p. 18) shows, 
there was a surge in investment in the second half of 
1936, and all components of investment do not start 
falling uniformly until late in 1937. 
By early 1938, the severity of the recession prompt-
ed a turnaround in fiscal policy. This was manifested 
in a dramatic announcement by President Roosevelt 
on April 14, 1938, of a new “spend–lend” program 
with a $2 billion increase in spending. 
To sum up, fiscal policy became tighter in early 
1937, with a brief return to a balanced budget due to 
tax increases. The stance was reversed in early 1938, 
shortly before the trough of the recession. 
Monetary policy 
Most of the recent discussions of the 1937 reces-
sion have centered on the monetary policy carried out 
by the Federal Reserve System. Because the 1930s were 
a period of great change for monetary policy, I will 
first provide some background on this change to show 
that the Fed abandoned its traditional instruments and 
adopted a passive attitude during the first half of the 
1930s. When policy became active again in 1935, it 
was through the use of a new instrument, namely, changes 
in reserve requirements, coupled with actions by the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury. The stance of mon-
etary policy, like that of fiscal policy, reversed as the 
1937 recession took its toll. I will then examine in 
more detail the response of the banking system to 
monetary policy during the recession. 
Background
The 1930s were a period of considerable change 
for U.S. monetary policy. The turning point was the 
Gold Reserve Act, passed on January 30, 1934. It na-
tionalized all gold in the United States, including the 
gold reserve held by the Fed. It authorized the presi-
dent to devalue the dollar, which he did immediately, 
changing the dollar price of an ounce of gold from $20.67 
(its price since the 1830s) to $35. This implied that the 
Treasury made a capital gain of 60 percent, or about 
$2 billion, on its newly acquired gold holdings. The 
proceeds were used to create an Exchange Stabilization 
Fund under the sole discretionary control of the Treasury. 
The existence of the fund gave the Treasury a strong 
hand in its dealings with the Fed, and for the next  
17 years the Treasury dominated monetary policy. 
From its foundation to the early 1930s, the Fed’s 
balance sheet had consisted essentially of its gold re-
serve, which backed the currency (subject to a 40 per-
cent reserve requirement) and private debt. Monetary 
policy consisted of managing the portfolio of private 
debt, either through discounting or, since the 1920s, 
through open-market purchases and sales of private 
debt. The debt was short-term, either commercial  
paper or bankers’ acceptances, with typically 90 days 
or less to maturity. 
Figure 6, panels A and B show the rates at which 
the Fed bought commercial paper and bankers’ accep-
tances, compared with open-market rates. The Fed’s 
rate in panel A is somewhat lower than the market 
rate because the latter pertains to paper of four to six 
months maturity, whereas the Fed purchased shorter 
maturities. Both panels in figure 6 show that, until 
1932, the Fed’s rate was close to the market rate; in 
other words, the Fed was active in the open market. 
After 1934, the Fed’s rates are above market rates, in-
dicating that the Fed had ceased to use interest rates 
for the conduct of monetary policy. 
In the years that followed, the stance of monetary 
policy was dictated by actions of the Treasury. This 
can be seen in figure 7, which plots the sources of re-
serve funds—that is, the existing and potential sources 
of legal tender. Treasury currency (that is, currency 
issued directly by the Treasury) and Federal Reserve 
credit—the first two components—played no role in 
the 1930s, as they remained essentially constant. The 
Fed’s portfolio during that period consisted of gold cer-
tificates (issued by the Treasury in 1934 in exchange for 
the Fed’s gold reserve) and government bonds. Private 
debt had completely disappeared. The portfolio was 
kept constant throughout the period, with a few minor 
exceptions. The gold stock, the third component, was 
the main source of variation in the monetary base. 
The Treasury did not immediately monetize the 
capital gain it had made on gold. The source of growth 
in the monetary base is to be found elsewhere. From 
1934 on, persistent gold inflows into the United States 
account for the growth in the gold component. There 
were two reasons for the inflows. After the devaluation 
of 1934, foreigners bought dollars because they had 
become cheaper (and U.S. domestic prices had not 
adjusted fully). Later, gold inflows continued because 
increasing political instability in Europe induced 
long-term capital flows into the United States. 21 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
The growth in reserves
Then, as now, the U.S. banking system comprised a 
variety of banks depending on supervisory jurisdiction. 
Banks incorporated under federal law were all members 
of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Banks incorporated un-
der state law could be members of the Federal Reserve 
System and the FDIC, the FDIC only, or neither. Unin-
corporated banks could be members of the FDIC. In June 
1936, member banks represented 70 percent of all bank 
deposits. In this section I focus on member banks’ statis-
tics, since they were more frequently collected by the 
Federal Reserve System and were directly affected by 
the System’s changes in reserve requirements.4 
Reserves (which can take the form of currency  
or balances at Federal Reserve Banks) were required 
by law since 1917. The quantity of required reserves  
depended on the total amount of demand deposits (net 
of deposits of other banks) or time deposits that a bank 
held, as well as its location (see table 2). Reserves above 
the required amount are excess reserves. If a bank lo-
cated in a central reserve city held $1 in excess reserves, 
it could potentially increase its demand deposits by 
an additional $7.69. 
For all member banks, reserves grew from 
$2,235 million in June 1933, near the trough of the 
When foreigners offered gold for sale, the Treasury 
issued gold certificates and deposited them at the Fed, 
increasing its account’s balances. The Treasury then used 
the increase to pay for the gold. Thus, gold inflows 
translated one for one into increases in the monetary 
base. In other words, gold inflows were monetized. This 
accounts for the steady increase in the monetary base. 
FIguRE 6
New York Reserve Bank (NYRB) rates 
and prevailing open-market rates, 1919–39
B. NYRB buying rate and open-market prevailing rate  
  for 90-day bankers’ acceptances
percent
A. NYRB discount rate and open-market prevailing rate   
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Note: Data are weekly over the period 1919–39.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(1943), tables 115, 117, and 121, pp. 442–445, 452–459.
FIguRE 7
Monetary base and components of the supply  
of reserve funds, 1934–40
Note: Data are weekly over the period January 3, 1934–
December 31, 1940.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
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Great Depression, to $6,613 million by March 1937, 
on the eve of the 1937 recession, a 300 percent increase. 
Demand deposits during the same period grew only from 
$26,564 million to $41,114 million—a 150 percent 
increase. With constant reserve requirements, this meant 
that excess reserves grew considerably: In January 
1934, they were estimated to be $827 million, but by 
March 1935, when the Fed began to be concerned, they 
had reached $2,200 million, or 48 percent of total re-
serves. By comparison, before the banking panics of 
1931, excess reserves were typically 2 percent or 3 per-
cent of total reserves (Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, 1943). 
Why did banks hold such large reserves? Friedman 
and Schwartz (1963) propose a shift in banks’ prefer-
ences for reserves as a consequence of the banking 
panics of 1931–33. This shift took place gradually over 
the period 1933–36, and subsided slowly only in the 
late 1930s and early 1940s as experience with the FDIC 
and general economic recovery made banks more com-
fortable holding lower levels of reserves.5 In contrast, 
Frost (1971) has argued that banks’ demand for reserves 
was stable throughout the period. With fixed costs of 
adjusting reserves, that demand for reserves behaves 
differently at low levels of interest rates than at higher 
levels. Below a certain threshold, the demand rises much 
more rapidly as rates fall. The reason is that, when short-
term rates are low, it is less costly to hold large amounts 
of reserves than repeatedly to incur the fixed cost of 
adjusting. Frost’s explanation for high reserves in the 
1930s is solely the low level of interest rates. 
Policy reaction (1935–37)
Beginning in March 1935, the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC), which determines monetary policy 
and interest rates, became increasingly concerned with 
the growth in excess reserves. Its members feared that 
such reserves could ultimately lead to an uncontrolled 
credit expansion, once banks decided to increase their 
deposits. At that date, the Fed staff prepared a back-
ground memo titled “Excess reserves and Federal  
Reserve policy.” The authors believed that increasing 
government debt supplied the bonds that led to reserve 
growth. But the memo concluded that neither past ex-
perience nor central bank theory gave any guidance 
for a policy response in the current circumstances 
(Meltzer, 2003, pp. 492–493). 
Yet in spite of mounting concerns, it took the Fed 
over a year to take action. This was due partly to the 
uncertainty presented in the March 1935 memo and 
partly to the need to avoid antagonizing the Treasury. 
Concerns over potential inflation were balanced against 
concerns over the recovery and the federal government’s 
desire for low interest rates when it was financing its debt. 
By October 1935, excess reserves in the banking 
system exceeded the Fed’s portfolio of government 
bonds, and the FOMC decided to analyze the distribution 
of excess reserves across banks to make sure that in-
creases in requirements would not fall disproportion-
ately on some banks. It also decided to coordinate policy 
with the Treasury. The ultimate result of this coordi-
nation was that the policy actions in 1936–37 took two 
forms: increases in reserve requirements by the Fed 
and sterilization of gold inflows by the Treasury  
(explained in more detail later). 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 544) see mone-
tary policy (that is, the increase in reserve requirements 
and, “no less important,” the gold sterilization program) 
as “a factor that significantly intensified the severity 
of the decline and also probably caused it to occur 
earlier than otherwise.” 
Reserve requirements
The Banking Act of 1935, passed in August 1935, 
made important changes to the structure of the Federal 
Reserve.6 One of the changes concerned reserve require-
ments. Since 1917, reserve requirements had been set 
in section 19 of the Federal Reserve Act at various levels 
depending on the location of the member bank.7 The 
Board of Governors was now given the authority to 
change the reserve requirements “in order to prevent 
injurious credit expansion or contraction,”8 but the 
requirements could be no lower than they had been 
since 1917 and no higher than twice those levels. 
The purpose of increasing the reserve requirements 
was to pave the way for a return to the Fed’s traditional 
policy tools, namely, rediscounting (buying privately 
issued debt at a discount to reflect the time to maturity) 
and open-market operations. The Fed thought that, as 
long as excess reserves were so large, it could have no 
effect on the banking sector’s lending activities. Only 
if banks became borrowers again would the Fed be 
able to ease or tighten policy; until then, in the famous 
phrase of Marriner Eccles, Chairman of the Board of 
Governors, the Fed would be “pushing on a string” 
(Meltzer, 2003, p. 478). 
Why were policymakers worried about inflation 
in 1936? The answer is twofold. First, there were ob-
jective signs of inflation. Wholesale prices, which had 
been stable in the early part of 1936, began to rise in 
late 1936 and early 1937. The annualized six-month 
change in wholesale prices rose steadily from 0.5 per-
cent in August 1936 to 10.2 percent in March 1937. 
Retail prices as measured by the National Industrial 
Conference Board’s (NICB) cost-of-living index did 
not rise as fast, but the 12-month change was never-
theless 5.4 percent by March 1937.9 23 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
The other answer is that some policymakers were 
still worried about repeating what they saw as the mis-
take of the 1920s. In that view, the Great Depression 
was partly a result of the speculative excesses of the 
1920s, which the Fed had not done enough to pre-
vent. Whether they saw incipient signs of a specula-
tive boom developing (or whether they wanted to 
prevent such a boom from getting started in the first 
place), there was for some an inclination toward pre-
emptive action. Although this view was perhaps not 
dominant in the FOMC, it nevertheless supported the 
move toward action in early 1937 and slowed the re-
versal of policy later on during the downturn. 
That said, it should be emphasized that the Fed did 
not see the increase in reserve requirements as contrac-
tionary, and its public pronouncements insisted that the 
stance of policy had not changed. In the Fed’s view, 
mopping up excess reserves through the increase in 
requirements should have had no effect. Recent authors 
such as Currie (1980), Calomiris and Wheelock (1998), 
and Telser (2001) have argued that the increase in re-
serve requirements did not cause the recession. 
Table 2 shows the changes in reserve requirements. 
The first increase in reserve requirements was announced 
on July 14, 1936, and went into effect a month later. At 
the time, total reserves stood at $5.87 billion, split almost 
exactly between required reserves of $2.95 billion and 
excess reserves of $2.92 billion. Thus, an increase of 
50 percent in reserve requirements could be easily met 
by banks with the excess reserves. 
The second and third increases were announced 
on January 30, 1937: The first was to take effect on 
March 1; the second on May 1. At the time of the an-
nouncement, total reserves had increased to $6.78  
billion, and required reserves were $4.62 billion, slightly 
higher than they had been after the first increase. The 
increase of 33 percent in requirements could again be 
met from excess reserves, leaving over 
$600 million in excess reserves. 
Figure 8, panel A shows total and  
estimated required reserves at weekly re-
porting member banks. The four vertical 
dotted lines on this panel and on panels B 
and C mark the four changes in reserve  
requirements (three increases and one 
decrease). 
Two things are apparent from figure 8. 
One is that, in the aggregate, the increase 
in reserve requirements did not reduce ex-
cess reserves to zero (see panel B): The 
estimated excess reserves on May 5, 1937, 
the first reporting date after the last increase, 
were $887 million—28 percent of what they 
were on August 12, 1936, before the increases began. 
The second point to make is that the growth of 
total reserves paused during 1937, and then resumed, 
mirroring the behavior of the monetary base (see  
figure 8, panel A). The two lines in the graph thus 
summarize the two prongs of monetary policy: The 
lower line (required reserves) reflects the Fed’s ac-
tions, while the upper line (total reserves) reflects 
Treasury’s sterilization of gold inflows. 
Gold sterilization
As explained previously, since 1934 the Treasury 
had let gold inflows increase the monetary base. Starting 
in December 1936, the Treasury changed its procedure. 
Instead of, in effect, converting gold inflows into the 
monetary base, it used proceeds from bond sales to 
pay for the gold that was brought to the Treasury at 
the price of $35 per ounce. As a result, the gold stock 
in the United States continued to increase but the mone-
tary base remained roughly constant (see figure 9, p. 26). 
From December 1936 to February 1938, the gold stock 
increased 15 percent, but the monetary base grew by 
only 4 percent. The policy was halted in February 
1938 and reversed over the ensuing months. 
The response of banks
How did banks respond to the increase in reserve 
requirements? Figure 8, panel B plots excess reserves. 
It is apparent that, in the aggregate, excess reserves 
were sufficient to meet the new requirements, and 
panel B shows no sign of banks scrambling to keep 
their excess reserves at high levels, contrary to what 
is occasionally asserted. 
The picture is somewhat different, however, if one 
looks at more disaggregated data. Figure 8, panel C shows 
the proportion of required reserves out of total reserves 
by class of member banks. Recall that member banks 
were classified according to their location. Banks in 
TaBlE 2
Member bank reserve requirements, 1917–41
    Percent of net    Percent of
    demand deposits    time deposits
  Central       
  reserve   Reserve   
Effective date  city  city  Country  All
June 21, 1917  13  10  7  3
August 16, 1936  19.5  15  10.5  4.5
March 1, 1937  22.75  17.5  12.25  5.25
May 1, 1937  26  20  14  6
April 16, 1938  22.75  17.5  12  5
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943), table 107,  
p. 400.24 4Q/2009, Economic Perspectives
New York City and Chicago (the two central reserve 
cities) were considerably closer to their limit than banks 
in reserve cities and country banks. 
A comparison of table 3 and table 4 confirms that 
the reaction of member banks in New York City was 
markedly different from that of the banking system 
overall. From June 1936 to June 1937, total deposits 
grew by 2.3 percent overall but only 0.3 percent in New 
York City member banks. Loans increased by 8.6 per-
cent overall, and by 21.2 percent among New York  
City banks; but the latter banks reduced their holdings 
of government bonds by 23.8 percent and other securities 
FIguRE 8








1934 ’35 ’36 ’37 ’38
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Central reserve city banks—Chicago
Central reserve city banks—New York
C. Proportion of required reserves out of total reserves, 
  by class of member banks
percent
Notes: Data for panels A and B are weekly over the period January 3, 1934–December 28, 1938; data for panel C are monthly over the 
period January 1934–December 1938. The four vertical dotted lines in each panel mark the four changes in reserve requirements (three 
increases and one decrease) noted in table 2. The shaded areas indicate official periods of recession as identified by the National Bureau  
of Economic Research.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943), tables 103 and 105,  
pp. 378–394, 396–398.25 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
   
All banks: Main assets and total deposits, 1936–38 
TaBlE 3
  Investments   
Call dates  Loans  Total  U.S. government bonds  Other securities  Deposits
  ( - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - millions of dollars - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - )
June 1936  20,636  27,776  17,323  10,453  57,884
December 1936  21,359  28,086  17,587  10,499  60,619
June 1937  22,410  27,155  16,954  10,201  59,222
December 1937  22,065  26,362  16,610  9,752  58,494
June 1938  20,982  26,230  16,727  9,503  58,792
December 1938  21,261  27,570  17,953  9,617  61,319
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943), table 2.
   
New York City member banks: Main assets and total deposits, 1936–38 
TaBlE 4
  Investments   
Call dates  Loans  Total  U.S. government bonds  Other securities  Reserves  Deposits
  ( - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - millions of dollars - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - )
June 30, 1936  3,528  6,028  4,763  1,265  2,106  11,387
December 31, 1936  3,855  5,426  4,209  1,217  2,658  11,824
March 31, 1937  3,961  5,140  3,829  1,311  2,719  11,400
June 30, 1937  4,276  4,730  3,630  1,100  2,749  11,421
December 31, 1937  3,673  4,640  3,595  1,045  2,738  10,759
March 7, 1938  3,532  4,785  3,611  1,174  2,941  10,570
June 30, 1938  3,172  4,841  3,740  1,101  3,517  11,192
September 28, 1938  3,146  5,209  3,987  1,222  3,743  11,410
December 31, 1938  3,262  5,072  3,857  1,215  4,104  11,706
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943), table 23.
by 13.0 percent, while banks overall reduced these 
holdings 2.1 percent and 2.4 percent, respectively. 
Although banks did not suddenly increase their 
reserve holdings, they did reduce the rate of growth 
of deposits. Figure 9 shows that demand deposits, which 
had been growing steadily at 20 percent per year since 
March 1933, grew more slowly starting in July 1936 
and peaked in March 1937. Over the next 12 months, 
they fell by 6 percent, reached a low in December 1937, 
and began growing again after the end of the recession. 
This describes the size of the banking sector from 
the liability side. Which assets shrank to meet this fall 
in liabilities? Figure 10 shows that member bank assets 
fell into three broad categories: reserves, investments 
(U.S. bonds and other securities), and loans. Reserves 
grew, as we saw. Loans were not affected much, although 
they grew more slowly than before. Among reporting 
member banks, the 12-month growth rate of loans peaks 
on August 4, 1937, at 19.1 percent, and the absolute 
level peaks on September 15, 1937, at $10.05 billion, 
16 percent higher than a year before. Loans then fall 
4.5 percent in the next three months as the recession 
deepens. The category that bore the brunt of the  
reduction was investments, particularly government 
debt, simply because those were the most liquid assets. 
This can be seen for weekly reporting member banks 
in table 5, which shows the composition of assets for 
the week following each change in reserve require-
ments. From the second to the third increase (March–
May 1937), total assets fell by $1.3 billion: Loans 
actually increased by $0.5 billion, and most of the  
reduction came from U.S. bonds. 
Looking at interest rates confirms that the impact 
of reserve requirements manifested itself on tradable 
securities rather than loans. Table 6 shows that rates 
charged by banks on loans were little affected (and in 
some locations fell) after the reserve requirements in-
creased, while short-term commercial paper rates rose. 
The impact of the second round of reserve require-
ment increases was felt immediately in the U.S. bond 
market. There is in fact a particular day, March 15, when 
U.S. long-term bonds, whose yields had remained 
very stable, went up by 2 basis points, prompting the 
Secretary of the Treasury to get on the phone and 26 4Q/2009, Economic Perspectives
complain to Eccles, the Chairman of the Fed, that the 
Fed had bungled the increase in reserve requirements. 
Figure 11, panels A and B show clearly how bond 
rates increased in March 1937, before the recession 
began. Figure 12, which shows that corporate issues 
declined sharply in March 1937, suggests a channel 
through which the increase in reserve requirements 
could have affected the economy, namely, by reducing 
the banking sector’s demand for (government and) 
corporate liabilities. The fall in lending translated into 
higher interest rates and a lower volume of issues. 
Prices
The behavior of prices (see figure 13) during the 
recession is broadly consistent with the notion that mon-
etary policy was contractionary. Whichever indicator 
one uses, it is apparent that prices peaked in mid-1937, 
as the recession was under way (recall that there is some 
ambiguity as to the exact starting date, either May or 
August). The aggregate indexes normally used (the 
deflators for gross domestic product and personal con-
sumption expenditures) are only available annually 
for this period. The monthly indexes such as the  
National Industrial Conference Board’s cost-of-living 
index and the Wholesale Price Index, closely watched at 
the time for evidence of inflation, both peaked in  
September 1937; the Consumer Price Index did too, 
although it is not a very good measure for this period 
because data were not collected on a monthly basis, 
and missing data are interpolated. 
What is rather puzzling is that the trend in prices, 
having turned deflationary during the recession, contin-
ued well after the end of the recession. The National 
Industrial Conference Board’s index bottoms out in 
June 1939, having declined by 2.2 percent since the end 
of the recession, while wholesale prices, having fallen 
3 percent, bottom out in August 1939 just before the 
outbreak of the European war sets off speculative buying. 
Cole and Ohanian (1999) have used the recession 
of 1920–21, during which output fell sharply after a 
steep drop in prices and recovered strongly once the 
deflation ended, to highlight the puzzling nature of 
the slow recovery after the end of deflation in 1933. 
The recovery of 1938 adds to this puzzle: The economy 
rebounded as sharply as in 1921—an analogy noted 
by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) in spite of contin-
ued deflation (Steindl, 2007). 
The following conclusions emerge from the fore-
going discussion. First, monetary policy was as much 
FIguRE 9
Monetary base, demand deposits at 
commercial banks, and money stock, 1919–39
 
Notes: Data are monthly over the period December 1919–
December 1939 and adjusted for cost of living. The shaded 
areas indicate official periods of recession as identified by  
the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Source: Friedman and Schwartz (1963), appendix A.
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Components of member banks’  
balance sheets, 1932–38
Note: Data are quarterly over the period 1932–38. 
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Short-term rates and lending rates, 1936–38
TaBlE 6
  1936  1937  1938
  June  December  June  December  June  December
  ( - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - percent - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - )
Short-term open-market rates  
 in New York City
  Prime commercial paper, 4–6 months  0.75  0.75  1.00  1.00  0.88  0.63
  Prime bankers’ acceptances, 90 days  0.13  0.19  0.47  0.44  0.44  0.44
Rates charged on customers’ loans 
 by banks in principal cities
  Total (19 cities)  2.71  2.58  2.57  2.52  2.56  2.60
  New York City  1.71  1.74  1.73  1.70  1.70  1.70
  North and East (7 cities)  3.02  2.94  2.79  2.72  2.70  2.95
  South and West (11 cities)  3.51  3.14  3.29  3.23  3.31  3.31
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943), tables 2, 120, and 124.
   
Assets of weekly reporting member banks after reserve requirement changes, 1936–38
TaBlE 5
            Balances with
    Government  Other    Vault  domestic  Total
  Loans  bonds  securities  Reserves  cash  banks  assets
  ( - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - millions of dollars - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - )
August 19, 1936  8,369  10,564  3,323  4,884  373  2,288  32,315
March 3, 1937  9,054  10,303  3,318  5,291  398  2,055  33,677
May 5, 1937  9,533  9,499  3,208  5,307  337  1,797  32,362
April 20, 1938  8,585  9,156  3,068  5,980  330  2,188  31,938
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943), table 48.
a consequence of Fed actions as Treasury actions. The 
fall in the money stock was a direct consequence of 
the gold sterilization program. Second, the increases 
in reserve requirements began to bite only in early 
1937. Finally, the channel through which monetary 
policy affected the banking system is not as straight-
forward as sometimes asserted. Lending did not begin 
to fall until the recession was under way. The reaction 
of the banking system was to liquidate securities 
holdings, primarily U.S. bonds, but also private sec-
tor securities. The impact on market rates is evident 
starting in March 1937. 
labor costs 
Roose (1954) and other authors have cited alter-
native explanations to the monetary and fiscal policy  
stories. A number of these stories center on increased 
labor costs, which I now take up. 
New Deal policies and the slow recovery
As Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 493) put it, 
“the most notable feature of the revival after 1933 was 
not its rapidity but its incompleteness”: Unemployment 
remained high throughout the 1930s, the revival was 
erratic and uneven, and private investment (particu-
larly construction) remained very low compared with 
the 1920s. They go on to note that prices rose much 
more than in earlier expansions despite the large re-
source gaps that remained. The reason was “almost 
surely the explicit measures to raise prices and wages 
undertaken with government encouragement and assis-
tance. ... In the absence of the wage and price push, 
the period 1933–37 would have been characterized 
by a smaller rise in prices and a larger rise in output 
than actually occurred” (Friedman and Schwartz, 
1963, pp. 498–499).
Cole and Ohanian (2004) develop a general equi-
librium model to address this question. Specifically, 
they document that output, consumption, investment, 28 4Q/2009, Economic Perspectives
and hours worked remained far below trend from 1934 
to 1939, while total factor productivity was back to 
trend in 1936 and wages were 10 percent to 20 percent 
above trend. They also document the history of the 
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which 
gave industries protection from antitrust legislation  
as long as firms raised prices and shared their profits 
with workers in the form of higher wages. The NIRA 
was struck down by the Supreme Court in May 1935, 
but the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), or 
Wagner Act, was passed in July 1935 to increase the 
bargaining power of unions; furthermore, according 
to Cole and Ohanian (2004), the Roosevelt adminis-
tration did not enforce antitrust laws, allowing firms 
to continue to collude in raising prices. The combined 
effect of firm collusion and worker bargaining power 
is shown in their equilibrium model to result in lower 
output than in a competitive version of the same econ-
omy. Starting from 1934 conditions and assuming the 
same changes in total factor productivity (that is, changes 
not due to changes in inputs) as in the data, the com-
petitive version of the economy returns to trend by 
1936 or so, while the cartelized version of the economy, 
calibrated so that wages are 20 percent above their 
normal level, displays lower consumption, investment, 
and employment, along with higher wages. 
New Deal policies and the 1937 recession
The Wagner Act, which is still in force today, im-
mediately generated legal challenges. Several cases 
involving that act were taken up by the Supreme Court 
in January 1937. 
figurE 12
New corporate security issues, total and
proceeds proposed as new money, 1934–40
Notes: Data are monthly over the period January 1934–
December 1940. The shaded area indicates an official period 
of recession as identified by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(1943), table 138, pp. 491–492.
billions of dollars
figurE 11
Rates on bonds, 1929–41
A. Rates on government bonds and corporate bonds, 
  by rating
percent











B. Rates on corporate bonds, by sector
percent
Notes: Data are monthly over the period January 1929–
December 1941. The shaded areas indicate official periods 
of recession as identified by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(1943), table 128, pp. 468–471.
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In an earlier version of their work, Cole and 
Ohanian (2001, p. 49) commented that “while more 
work is required to assess the 1937–38 downturn, our 
theory raises the possibility that an increase in labor 
bargaining power may have been an important con-
tributing factor to the downturn of 1937–38.” In re-
cent testimony to the Senate, Ohanian (2009) went 
further to assert: “Wages jumped in many industries 
shortly after the NLRA was upheld by the Supreme 
Court in 1937, and our research shows that these higher 
wages played a significant role in the 1937–38 eco-
nomic contraction.” 
The behavior of wages
Figure 14 shows the behavior of wages, as mea-
sured by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
and the National Industrial Conference Board, both  
in nominal terms and deflated by the monthly cost-of-
living index computed by the National Industrial 
Conference Board. 
Nominal average hourly earnings as measured by 
the BLS had been close to constant from January to 
August 1936, oscillating between $0.571 and $0.575. 
They fell to $0.569 in September and then began to rise. 
By April 1937, they had reached $0.638; they peaked at 
$0.667 in November of that year, 17 percent higher than 
in September 1936. But most of that increase (70 per-
cent) had taken place before the Supreme Court handed 
down its decision on April 12, 1937. The picture is not 
much different if we look at the National Industrial 
Conference Board’s index: According to this measure, 
67 percent of the rise had occurred before the decision. 
Stock prices (shown in figure 15) do not support 
the notion that the release of the Supreme Court deci-
sion suddenly shifted bargaining power within exist-
ing collusive arrangements from firms to workers. If 
that had been the case, then the net present value of 
the firms’ share of the collusive rents should have fallen 
upon receipt of the news. In fact, April 12, 1937, was 
a quiet day on stock markets, and the next day the Wall 
Street Journal commented that the decision “caused 
little more than a ripple in the markets,” an initial 
sell-off in steels having been recovered before day’s 
end, and trading before and after the decision “hardly 
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Various measures of prices, 1929–41 
Note: The shaded areas indicate official periods of recession 
as identified by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Sources: Beney (1936); National Industrial Conference 
Board (1938, 1939, 1940); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
from National Bureau of Economic Research, Macrohistory 
Database, series m04169a; and U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis from Haver 
Analytics.
index, 1929 = 100
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Indexes of nominal and real wages, 1929–40
Notes: Data are monthly over the period January 1929–
December 1940. The shaded areas indicate official periods 
of recession as identified by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current 
Business, 1934–41, various issues.
index, 1936 = 1
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better than dull.” The paper went on to assert that “had 
the decisions ... gone the other way, there is little doubt 
that the share market would have responded with a show 
of active buying; but as the reverse was true, the stock 
market’s following managed to be philosophic about 
it” (Dow Jones and Company, 1937b, p. 37).  
The commentary, as well as a quotation by Henry 
Ford the following day that “we thought the Wagner 
Act was the law right along” (Dow Jones and Company, 
1937a, p. 2), suggests that the decision had been cor-
rectly anticipated all along. Surprisingly, however, the 
stock market had been rising steadily over the previous 
two years. From May 1935, when the NIRA was struck 
down, to April 1937, it shot up 70 percent (see figure 15). 
Why did wages rise in 1936–37?
There is little doubt that the rise in wages was 
linked to the Wagner Act and the resulting increase  
in labor union activity. Figure 16 compares the level 
of wages with the number of man-days lost to strikes. 
While strikes were recurrent throughout the period,  
a sustained increase in strikes is noticeable from the 
end of 1936 to a peak in June 1937 of 5 million man-
days—four times the decade’s average. 
To test the claim that the Wagner Act caused wage 
increases in manufacturing, I looked at wages in rail-
roads and farming, sectors to which the act did not 
apply. Figure 17 shows data collected by the National 
Industrial Conference Board for wage rates in 25 in-
dustries, all wage earners in Class I railroads, and farm 
labor. Wages did not rise for railroad employees when 
they were rising in industry: In fact, railroad wages 
fell during the same period. However, farm wages 
follow the same pattern as industrial wages through-
out the whole period. 
I have looked at industry data to see if industries 
that saw a greater increase in wages also saw a larger 
drop in employment. To do this, I regressed the per-
centage change in employment from July 1937 to June 
1938 (the peak and trough of total employment) on 
the percentage change in average hourly earnings 
from September 1936 to November 1937 (the trough and 
peak of nominal wages in figure 14, p. 29). The results 
for the 31 industries are shown in figure 18. The rela-
tionship is negative and significantly different from 0  
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Nominal wages and man-days lost
to strikes, 1932–40
Notes: Data are monthly over the period January 1932–
December 1940 (the BLS series starts in January 1934). 
Factory hourly average earnings are measured on the left-
hand scale, and idle man-days due to strikes are measured 
on the right-hand scale.
Sources: National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Macrohistory Database, series m08257; and U.S. Bureau 
of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business, 1934–41, 
various issues.
index, 1936 = 1, deflated  
by NICB cost-of-living index
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Stock prices, 1934–40
Notes: Data are weekly over the period January 3, 1934–
December 25, 1940. The dashed vertical line marks  
April 13, 1937, the day after the Supreme Court decision  
on the Wagner Act was released. 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(1943), table 134.
index, 1935−39 = 100 
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at the 1 percent confidence level. The coefficient is 
large: A 1 percent increase in wages leads to a 1.8 percent 
fall in employment, but it is imprecisely estimated. 
More problematic is the fact that these results  
are not robust to slight changes in the dates at which 
the changes are measured. For example, just changing 
the end date for wage increases from November 1937 
to June 1937 reduces the R2 statistic from 22 percent 
to 7 percent; and the estimated coefficient is three 
times smaller and not significantly different from 0  
at the 5 percent confidence level. 
Quantitative assessment 
I have described the main explanations proposed 
for the recession of 1937. To assess which one (or more) 
of these explanations is the most plausible, it is neces-
sary to go beyond theoretical plausibility and pure  
issues of timing. Ideally, one would construct a well-
specified economic model that encompasses the com-
peting explanations, estimate the parameters of the model 
using actual data, and then carry out experiments in 
the model. This is a difficult task, if only because there 
is not an agreed-upon model to use. 
It is nevertheless possible to make a quantitative 
assessment, using the techniques of vector autore-
gression (VAR) analysis. The basic idea behind VAR 
analysis is to construct a statistical model of the rela-
tions between any number of variables of interest. 
The variables are all interrelated, both over time  
(one variable’s current value affects another variable’s 
future value) and within a single time period. That is 
because, typically, all of the variables are determined 
simultaneously by the economy. Prices do not explain 
quantities any more than quantities explain prices: Both 
are determined jointly by supply and demand relation-
ships. In a dynamic setting, where variables evolve 
over time, an additional complication is that the future 
may influence the past. Suppose that it is known with 
certainty that a certain event will take place a year 
from now; individuals will plan ahead accordingly 
and alter their decisions today. The future is embedded 
in the present to the extent that it is anticipated. Only 
surprises may reveal to us what the effect of a particular 
variable might be. 
VAR analysis is in some ways a generalization  
of standard regression analysis but acknowledges that 
the left-hand-side variable in one relation is the right-
hand-side variable in another. Therefore all regressions 
are computed simultaneously. Each regression has a 
residual, which represents the effect of unexpected or 
unexplained variations. For example, we may specify 
that output is a function of past values of money growth, 
FIguRE 17
Average hourly earnings in 25 industries and
in railroads and wage rates of farm labor, 1932–40
Notes: The average hourly earnings data for the 25 industries  
and the railroads are monthly and the monthly wage rates  
of farm labor data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, over the 
period 1932–40. The shaded areas indicate official periods 
of recession as identified by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research.
Sources: National Industrial Conference Board (1938, 1939, 
1940).
index, 1936 = 1
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Impact of wage increases on employment
across 31 industries
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the  
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current 
Business, 1936–38, various issues.
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Variance–covariance matrix of the residuals of the vector autoregression
TaBlE 7
  M1  Surplus  AHE  CP rate  WPI  IP
M1  1.000
Surplus  –  0.026  1.000
AHE  –  0.203  0.087  1.000
CP rate  –  0.454  –  0.041  0.041  1.000
WPI  0.070  –  0.064  –  0.405  0.059  1.000
IP  0.355  –  0.032  –  0.475  –  0.163  0.327  1.000
Note: M1 is the money stock; surplus is the federal surplus; AHE is an index of real average hourly earnings in industries, adjusted for changes  
in output per man-hour; CP rate is the interest rate on commercial paper; WPI is the Wholesale Price Index; and IP is industrial production.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from Friedman and Schwartz (1963); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943),  
tables 115, 117, 121, and 150; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, G.17 statistical release, various issues; and National  
Bureau of Economic Research, Macrohistory Database, series 08142 and 01300.
fiscal surplus, wages, and other variables of interest. 
In each time period, we will have the predicted value 
of output based on the past histories of these variables, 
and the actual value will differ to some extent: That is 
the error term, or innovation. Statistical theory tells 
us that a system of variables can be represented as the 
sum of the responses to current and past innovations. 
If the innovations are properly identified, it becomes 
possible to say, for example, that output responds in  
a certain way to an unexpected change in money 
growth or fiscal policy. 
The problem is to identify the innovations to each 
variable. If we allow that, say, monetary policy can 
be affected within the current period by fiscal policy, 
then the error term in the money equation will com-
bine innovations to money as well as innovations to 
fiscal policy. In that case, output responses to this in-
novation will be responses to both monetary policy 
and fiscal policy, and statistics are of no use in disen-
tangling the two. In general, one must make identify-
ing assumptions guided by economic theory to interpret 
a VAR. 
The VAR I run includes a small set of variables 
to describe the state of the economy: industrial produc-
tion (IP), the rate on commercial paper to measure short-
term interest rates, and the Wholesale Price Index 
(WPI) to represent prices (Sims, 1980; and Burbidge 
and Harrison, 1985). Furthermore, it includes one vari-
able for each competing explanation: the money stock 
(M1), the federal surplus, and an index of real average 
hourly earnings in industries (AHE), adjusted for changes 
in output per man-hour.10 The data are monthly and 
extend from January 1919 to December 1941.11
The main identifying assumption is that money 
does not respond within the month to other contem-
porary variables. Thus, innovations to the regression 
of money growth on other variables represent only  
innovations to money growth itself. This is a common 
identification assumption for post-World War II data 
(Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1999). I also  
assume that surpluses do not react within the month 
to anything but money growth, and that the wage 
does not respond to anything but money growth and 
the fiscal variable. 
As it turns out, this particular ordering matters 
little. Table 7 shows the variance–covariance matrix 
of the residuals from the VAR. Note how it is close to 
diagonal in the first three elements, which means that 
the residuals of the monetary, fiscal, and wage equa-
tions are uncorrelated. Therefore, the residuals of the 
regressions can be interpreted as fundamental innova-
tions, that is, exogenous and unpredictable changes in 
the monetary, fiscal, and wage conditions.12
Table 8 shows that the percentage of forecast  
error at various horizons is attributable to the innova-
tions in each of the variables. The three factors together 
explain about half of the unpredictable movements in 
industrial production, but wages alone explain little. 
The other half is attributable to innovations to the other 
variables (interest rate, prices, and industrial produc-
tion itself) to which I do not try to attach any particu-
lar meaning. 
To understand how much each factor (monetary 
policy, fiscal policy, and wages) contributed to the  
recession of 1937, I examine a historical decomposi-
tion. The method is as follows. Using the estimated 
statistical relationships between the variables and data 
up through December 1935 only, I predict what in-
dustrial production will be in all succeeding months. 
Then, for each of the three factors, I compute the ef-
fect of its innovations on all the variables in each of 
the succeeding months from January 1936 to the end 
of the sample in December 1941. An innovation to 
money growth affects future money growth, but also 
all other variables. The effect of the sequence of in-
novations that I have computed from January 1936 33 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
   
Variance decomposition of industrial production at various horizons
TaBlE 8
  Standard
Months  error  M1  Surplus  AHE  CP rate  WPI  IP
  ( - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - percent - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - )
             
6  0.097  15.5  4.8  16.1  4.3  6.8  52.6
12  0.136  30.3  7.9  11.2  2.5  5.0  43.0
18  0.165  39.1  8.5  7.7  2.7  3.5  38.4
24  0.187  41.2  8.3  6.9  3.2  2.8  37.7
30  0.203  40.4  8.0  6.8  3.3  2.5  38.9
36  0.216  39.2  8.1  6.7  3.4  2.2  40.4
Note: M1 is the money stock; surplus is the federal surplus; AHE is an index of real average hourly earnings in industries, adjusted for changes  
in output per man-hour; CP rate is the interest rate on commercial paper; WPI is the Wholesale Price Index; and IP is industrial production.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from Friedman and Schwartz (1963); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943),  
tables 115, 117, 121, and 150; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, G.17 statistical release, various issues; and National  
Bureau of Economic Research, Macrohistory Database, series 08142 and 01300.
onward can be traced out for each factor and added to 
the baseline projection of industrial production, rep-
resenting how much that factor explains. 
The results are shown in figure 19. The black line 
represents the actual path of industrial output over the 
period. The baseline represents the forecast for indus-
trial output based on information up through December 
1935. This forecast essentially sees industrial output 
growing at a 4.5 percent trend. To the baseline I add 
successively the effect of innovations to the money 
stock (M1), to the surplus, and to wages. 
The figure supports the following conclusions. 
First, the effect of changes in wages starting in early 
1937 was to depress output, but by a small amount.13 
Moreover, the effect remains negative until late 1941, 
which is not surprising, since, as we saw, wages re-
mained relatively high. Second, fiscal shocks and mon-
etary shocks between them do a good job of accounting 
for the recession, with the following nuances. If mon-
etary and fiscal shocks had been the only forces at play, 
the economy should have peaked in late 1936. Also, the 
monetary shock alone does not explain the full depth 
of the recession; the fiscal and monetary shocks ex-
plain the economy’s turning point in mid-1938, but 
not the full extent of the recovery. 
This indicates that other forces at work in the econ-
omy sustained the expansion from late 1936 to mid-
1937, in spite of the contractionary impact of monetary 
policy and fiscal policy. Likewise, other forces con-
tributed to the recovery, even as monetary policy and 
fiscal policy turned expansionary in mid-1938. 
The results from the VAR need to be interpreted 
with caution. In particular, they do not disprove the 
importance of wages. In the Cole and Ohanian (2004) 
story, the change in workers’ bargaining power is not 
a temporary shock to an otherwise stationary system, 
but a shift from one steady-state equilibrium to another. 
The VAR is not designed to capture such changes. 
The results do suggest, however, that as a quantitative 
matter the monetary and fiscal shocks are sufficient to 
account for the general pattern of the recession. Further-
more, the extent to which these factors fail to reproduce 
the data is by predicting an earlier and more prolonged 
downturn; in other words, the factor that is missing is an 
expansionary one, not a contractionary one like wages. 
Conclusion 
The recession of 1937 has been cited as a caution-
ary tale about the dangers of premature policy tight-
ening on the way out of a deep downturn. In contrast, 
some authors have downplayed the role of monetary 
policy suggested by Friedman and Schwartz (1963). 
In particular, Cole and Ohanian (1999) dismiss the role 
of reserve requirements in the 1937 recession for two 
reasons. One is timing: “we would expect to see out-
put fall shortly after” the changes in reserve require-
ments; but, they write, industrial production peaked 
in August 1937, 12 months after the first change (Cole 
and Ohanian, 1999, p. 10). The other is that interest 
rates did not increase: Commercial loan rates remained 
in the same range, and rates on corporate bonds “were 
roughly unchanged between 1936 and 1938” (Cole 
and Ohanian, 1999, p. 10).  
I have shown in this article that tightened mone-
tary policy consisted in the joint action of increased 
reserve requirements that were staggered from August 
1936 to May 1937 and gold sterilization that started 
in December 1936. Gold sterilization turned the growth 
rate of money negative, and banks responded to in-
creased reserve requirements by curtailing the financing 
of firms, with visible effects on interest rates. Industrial 
production peaked only a few months later, in May 1937. 34 4Q/2009, Economic Perspectives
Moreover, monetary policy went into reverse: The 
New York Fed lowered its discount rate from 1.5 per-
cent to 1 percent on September 27, 1937; the gold 
sterilization program ended in February 1938 and 
was reversed from February to April; and reserve re-
quirements were lowered on April 16, 1938, just as 
the federal government announced a large increase in 
spending. The recession ended in June 1938. 
An alternative story would rely on increased labor 
costs due to the effects of the Wagner Act. The act was 
passed in 1935, but labor activism built up over the  
ensuing two years and resulted in 10 percent wage in-
creases over a short period in early 1937. Although it 
has no particular timing advantage over the monetary 
and fiscal policy explanations, the labor costs story 
would plausibly account for the onset of the recession 
but not for the recovery, since the wage increases 
were not reversed. 
Finally, a simple VAR shows that monetary and 
fiscal factors account fairly well for the pattern of in-
dustrial production and, in particular, for the depth of 
the recession, although other factors are needed to ex-
plain why the economy did not contract earlier and why 
it rebounded so strongly. Wages cannot account for 
much of the downturn. Naturally, there are limits to 
the persuasiveness of an essentially statistical exer-
cise. But, in the absence of a full-fledged economic 
model, this exercise suggests no additional explana-
tion may be needed. 
FIguRE 19
Historical decomposition of industrial output,
1936–41
Notes: Data are monthly over the period January 1936–
December 1941. M1 is the money stock; surplus is the 
federal surplus.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from Friedman 
and Schwartz (1963); Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (1943), tables 115, 117, 121, and 150; 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, G.17 
statistical release, various issues; and National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Macrohistory Database, series 08142 
and 01300.
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NOTES
1See Blinder, (2009), Krugman (2009), and Romer (2009).
2Author’s calculations based on data from the U.S. Bureau of 
Economy Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts of the 
United States.
3These were computed as the marginal tax rate weighted by the 
number of returns in each bracket above $4,000, using numbers in  
U.S. Department of the Treasury (1938, p. 88; 1940, pp. 119, 193). 
Barro and Sahasakul (1983) find much lower average marginal tax 
rates because the number of filers was only 20 percent of all house-
holds, and they assign a zero marginal tax rate to the other 80 percent.
4Member banks made quarterly reports, whereas nonmember banks 
reported twice a year. Furthermore, some member banks, representing 
82 percent of all member banks by assets, reported statistics on a 
weekly basis.
5The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which began operations 
in January 1934, levied a premium on participating banks based  
on total deposits, and insured deposits up to $5,000 per depositor. 
In 1936, insured deposits amounted to $22,230 million, representing 
68 percent of the deposits of participating banks and 47 percent of 
all bank deposits (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, 1943, p. 401).
6Banking Act of 1935 (49 Stat. 706).
7There were two central reserve cities, namely, New York and 
Chicago, and 60 reserve cities (see the list in Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, 1943, p. 401).
8Banking Act of 1935 (49 Stat. 706).
9Beney (1936) and National Industrial Conference Board (1938).
10The data come from the NBER Macrohistory Database, series 08142 
and 01300. Wages are deflated by the Wholesale Price Index.
11The VAR is monthly; all variables are in logs except the surplus, 
which can be negative. A time trend and seasonal dummies are added 
because the surplus is not seasonally adjusted. Lag length, chosen 
to minimize the Akaike information criterion, is 3. As an alternative, 
I have also used (the log of) man-days idle due to strikes instead of 
wages.
12There is some negative correlation between wages adjusted for labor 
productivity and money. An alternative specification in which average 
hourly earnings are not adjusted for productivity yields a nearly  
diagonal matrix, and the results of the historical decomposition are 
quite similar.
13The impulse response function of wages on output is negative at 
first but turns positive after ten months. This suggests that the 
shock identified as a wage shock is more complex than a shock to 
workers’ bargaining power and probably includes a productivity 
component. If man-days idled by strikes is used instead of wages, 
the impulse response function is consistently negative, but of small-
er magnitude: The percentage of IP variance explained by innova-
tions to man-days at the three-year horizon is 2.5 percent instead of 
6.5 percent for average hourly earnings.36 4Q/2009, Economic Perspectives
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